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ABSTRACT
The Indian economy has experienced a major transformation during the decade of the 1990s.
Apart from the impact of various unilateral economic reforms undertaken since 1991, the economy also
had to reorient itself to the changing multilateral trade discipline within the newly written GATT/WTO
framework.  The unilateral trade policy measures have encompassed exchange-rate policy, foreign
investment, external borrowing, import licensing, custom tariffs, and export subsidies.  The multilateral
aspect of India’s trade policy refers to India’s WTO commitments regarding trade in goods and services,
trade-related investment measures, and intellectual property rights.  The present study analyzes the
economic effects on India and other major trading countries/regions of the Uruguay Round (UR) trade
liberalization and the liberalization that might be undertaken in a new WTO negotiating round.  India’s
welfare gain is expected to be 1.1% ($4.7 billion over its 2005 GDP) when the UR scenarios get fully
implemented.  The additional welfare gain is an estimated 2.7% ($11.4 billion) when the assumed future
WTO round of multilateral trade liberalization is achieved.  Resources would be allocated in India to the
labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, clothing, leather and leather products, and food, beverages, and
tobacco.  These sectors would also experience growth in output and exports.  Real returns to both labor
and capital would increase in the economy.  The scale effect (percent change in output per firm) is
positive for all the ten sectors of manufacturing, indicating that Indian firms become more efficient than
before.  Finally, even if India undertakes unilateral trade liberalization of the order indicated in the WTO
multilateral scenarios, it would still benefit, although less so than with multilateral liberalization.
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I.  Introduction
The Indian economy has experienced a major transformation during the decade of the
1990s.  Apart from the impact of various unilateral economic reforms undertaken since 1991, the
economy has had to reorient itself to the changing multilateral trade discipline within the newly
written GATT/WTO framework.  The unilateral trade policy measures have encompassed
exchange-rate policy, foreign investment, external borrowing, import licensing, custom tariffs
and export subsidies.  The multilateral aspect of India’s trade policy refers to India’s WTO
commitments with regard to trade in goods and services, trade related investment measures, and
intellectual property rights.
The multilateral trade liberalization under the auspices of the Uruguay Round Agreement
and the forthcoming WTO negotiations is aimed at reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers on
international trade.  The purpose of our study is to provide a computational analysis of the impact
of such changes in trade barriers on the economic welfare, trade, and the intersectoral allocation
of resources in India and its major trading partners.
Our study is organized as follows.  Section II deals with the experience of India during
the 1990s with regard to its unilateral liberalization moves as well as changes induced through
multilateral trade negotiations.  In Section III, we present a computational analysis of the impact
on India of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the prospective WTO negotiations that are
presently underway and that will continue in the next few years pending a consensus on the
negotiating agenda.  A specially designed version of the NCAER-University of Michigan CGE2
Model of World Production and Trade is used for this purpose.  Conclusions and policy
implications are discussed in Section IV.
II.  India in the Changing Global Trade Scenario during the 1990s
Even though India’s trade regime began to be liberalized in the late 1970s, 93% of its
local production of internationally tradable goods continued to be protected by some type of
quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports as of 1990-91 (Pursell, 1996).  The QR coverage was
94% for agricultural and 90% for manufactured intermediate, and capital goods.  Import licenses
were granted subject to indigenous clearance, that is, a proof that there was no source of
indigenous supply.  India had one of the most restrictive import-tariff structures among
developing countries.  The import-weighted tariff rate was 87% in 1989-90 accompanied by a
collection rate of 51%.  There was a rapid increase in import tariffs in the latter half of the 1980s.
Such a protective regime led India into a sustained phase of allocating its resources inefficiently.
Its share in world trade declined from 2% in 1950-51, 1% in 1965-66, and 0.5% by 1973-74.  It
continued to hover around this figure until 1990-91.
India's trade policy regime was quite complex up to the beginning of 1990s.  There were
various categories of importers, import licenses and methods of importing.  The regime’s details
were contained in 19 Appendices and spanned over 200 pages.  The Import and Export Policy
(1990-93) was replaced by the Export and Import Policy (1992-97) with effect from April 1,
1992.
1 The content was substantially reduced to 20 pages, thus making matters simpler for
exporters and importers.  The new EXIM 1992-97 policy contained Negative List imports subject
to licensing.
2 Almost all consumer goods remained subject to import licensing.
The first stage of India's reforms after 1991 continued to focus on manufacturing while
agriculture was largely ignored.  The share of value added in the manufacturing sector protected
by QRs declined from 90 to 47% by May 1992 and to 36% by May 1995 (Pursell, 1996, p. 5).
The corresponding decline was much less in agriculture, from 94 to 93% by May 1992 and
further to 84% by May 1995.
It has been estimated that about one-third of the value of India's imports in 1998-99 were
still subject to some type of NTBs (Mehta, 1998, pp. 35-36).  After the EXIM Policy (April
1998) announcement, about 30% of the 10-digit tariff lines (3,068 out of 10,281) under the
Harmonized System of India's trade classification (HS-ITC) were subject to NTBs.
3 The 3,0683
restricted tariff lines include 1,379 lines for consumer goods.  The import value of these
consumer goods is only 0.2% of India’s total imports, thus reflecting the relatively high degree of
restrictions.  The import of 40% of agricultural products is still restricted since these are
classified as consumer goods.
Prior to 1991, India’s import tariff rates were among the highest in the world.  The Tax
Reforms Committee chaired by Chelliah proposed that the import-weighted average duty rate
should go down from 87% in 1989-90 to 45% in 1995-96 and further to 25% by 1998-99
(Government of India, 1993).  India has lowered its average (unweighted) applied tariff rate from
125% in 1990-91 to 71% in 1993-94, 41% in 1995-96, and to 35% in 1997-98 (Table 1).  The
corresponding reduction in the import-weighted average has gone down from 87% in 1990-91 to
47% in 1993-94, 25% in 1995-96, and to 20% in 1997-98, thus moving ahead of the
recommendations of the Chelliah Committee.
4 The peak rate of duty has declined from 355% in
1990-91 to 45% in 1997-98 and to 40% in 1999-2000.
The World Bank estimates of changes in tariffs on consumer, intermediate and capital
goods are given in Table 2.  Though the average import-weighted tariff rate on consumer goods
has been reduced from 153% in 1990-91 to 25% in 1997-98, a large portion of this category still
remains protected by QRs.
The import of some restricted items has been liberalized through freely transferable
Special Import Licenses (SILs).  Apart from being used as a step towards liberalization, the SIL
regime also provides incentives to: large established exporters; exporters of electronic and
telecommunication equipment, diamonds, gems and jewelry; and manufacturers who have
acquired the prescribed quality certification.
The coverage of tariff lines has gradually expanded since their introduction in 1992-93.
Tariff lines have typically moved from the restricted list to the SIL list, and thereafter to the free
list.  SILs were concentrated in industrial products with nearly 56% of the HS eight-digit tariff
lines under SIL as on April 1, 1997.  The corresponding coverage was 30% for textile and
clothing products and 15% for agricultural products including fisheries (WTO, TPR-India, 1998,
p. 66).  The SIL coverage has been extended systematically since April 1997, freeing various
items from the restricted list to the SIL list and from the SIL list to the OGL list.4
Various items have also been liberalized from two of the most restricted groups, namely
agro products and consumer goods.  The recently freed agro products include dairy items, fish
and a variety of processed foods while the consumer goods include toiletries, electronic items
and cooking ranges.  India’s unrestrained use of QRs was strongly challenged in the WTO
balance-of-payments committee by the United States, European Union, and other developed
countries in December 1995.
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India is a founding member of the GATT (1947) as well as of the WTO, which came into
effect from January 1, 1995.  By virtue of its WTO membership, India automatically is availed of
Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN) and National Treatment (NT) from all WTO members
for its exports and vice versa.  Its participation in this increasingly rule-based system is aimed
towards ensuring more stability and predictability in its international trade.
The Uruguay Round resulted in increased tariff binding commitments by developing
countries.  India bound 67% of its tariff lines compared to 6% prior to this round.  All
agricultural tariff lines and nearly 62% of the tariff lines for industrial goods are now bound.  The
unbound lines include some consumer goods and industrial items.  Ceiling bindings for industrial
goods are generally at 40% ad valorem for finished goods and 25% on intermediate goods,
machinery and equipment.  The phased reduction to these bound levels is to be achieved during
the 10-year period commencing in 1995.  Tariff rates on equipment covered under the
Information Technology Agreement and software are to be brought down to zero by 2005.  The
only exception is in textiles in which India has kept the option of reverting to the 1990 tariff
levels in case the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing does not fully materialize by 2005.  It may
be observed from Table 3, that applied tariff rates in India are below the Uruguay Round bound
levels.  The differential is greatest in the case of agriculture and also in the unprocessed primary
goods categories.
Quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports are currently maintained on Balance-of-
Payments (BOP) grounds for 1,429 tariff lines at the 8-digit level.  These include items relating
to textiles, agriculture, consumer goods and a variety of manufactured goods.  With the
improvement in India’s balance of payments since 1991, India has been asked to phase out its
QRs.  Based on presentations before the BOP Committee and subsequent consultations with
India’s main trading partners, an agreement has been reached to phase out QRs by 2001.5
Under the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement, India has notified
the TRIMs that it has maintained.  These have to be eliminated by January 1, 2000.  Under the
Information Technology Agreement (ITA), tariffs have to be brought down to zero on 95 HS-6
digit tariff lines by the year 2000, on 4 more tariff lines by 2003, on 2 more tariff lines by 2004
and on the balance of 116 tariff lines in the year 2005.  India is also committed, under the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, to
establishing and administering national standards and technical regulations, keeping in view the
basic precepts of MFN, National Treatment and Transparency.
With respect to services, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has a
“positive list” approach, thereby allowing WTO members to take on obligations in the sector of
their choice.  India has made commitments in 33 activities, as compared to an average of 23
activities for all developing countries.  India's objective in the service negotiations was to offer
entry to foreign service-providers in which entry was considered to be most advantageous in
terms of capital inflows, technology, and employment.
Notwithstanding the recent liberalization of the foreign direct investment regime,
restrictions on these investments continue to impede market access in the services sectors.
Foreign equity is limited to 49% in some of the major components of telecommunications
(including basic cellular, mobile, paging and other wireless services.  The corresponding limit is
20% in the banking sector.  Other service areas such as shipping, roads, ports, and air are
beginning to open up, but foreign participation remains low.  Railways remain one of the six
areas reserved for the public sector, although some private sector participation is encouraged in
some off-line activities.  The insurance sector is still not open for private investors.  Opening up
of the services sectors to international competition under GATS is expected to make these sectors
more efficient, which, in turn, would lead to gain in GDP of India's economy.
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It is evident from the preceding discussion that India has undertaken a relatively broad
liberalization of its trade policy as compared to the pre-1991 period.  This is true for both its
unilateral and multilateral reform commitments.  However, much more remains to be done
particularly since the tariff barriers continue to remain relatively high.  Also, many consumer-
goods imports are still constrained.6
With the foregoing as background, we turn now to a computational analysis of the trade-
liberalization provisions in the Uruguay Round and some possible liberalization efforts in the
forthcoming WTO round of trade negotiations.
III.  Computational Analysis of India’s Trade Reforms in a Global Setting
The empirical evidence from a number of studies points to a strong and significant effect
of openness to trade on growth performance (Srinivasan, 1998).  Thus, it is expected that the
multilateral liberalization of trade should benefit countries of the world in general.  In this section
we will analyze the impact of trade liberalization provisions in the Uruguay Round and some
possible liberalization efforts in the forthcoming WTO round of negotiations.  For comparative
purposes, we shall also analyze hypothetical scenarios when only India undertakes unilateral
liberalization.  For this purpose we use simulation analysis to assess the potential economic
effects arising from the implementation of the various liberalization provisions.  The simulations
are based on a special version of the NCAER-University of Michigan computable general
equilibrium (CGE) patterned after the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade.  The
main features of the model are described in Stern et al. (2000) and Chadha et al. (1999), and the
equations and other details are available on the University of Michigan website:
www.umich.spp.edu/rsie/.  The country/region and sectoral coverage of the model are noted in
Tables 4 and 5.
Computational Scenarios
The main data source for the model is “The GTAP-4 Database” (McDougall et al., 1998),
which refers to 1995.  For purposes of analysis, we have projected this database from 1995 to 2005.
This provides us with an approximate picture of what the world could be expected to look like in
2005 assuming that the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement reached in 1995 had not existed.  We then
analyze the impact of the UR-induced changes that may occur during the 10-year implementation
period after 1995 with respect to reduction/removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade.  The
scaled-up database of 2005 is then readjusted to mimic the world as it might look once the UR
Agreement had been fully implemented.  We then carry out some liberalization scenarios for WTO
negotiations that involve possible reductions in tariffs on agriculture and manufacturing and
reductions of barriers to services trade and FDI.7
The computational scenarios are as follows:
UR1 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) is analyzed by simulating the effects of the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement (MFA) phase-out under the Uruguay-Round (UR) agreement.  This is done
through bringing the export-tax equivalents of the MFA-affected developing countries/regions
down to zero.
7
UR2 All the countries/regions reduce their bilateral import tariffs as per the UR agreement on the
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing sectors along with complete elimination of export-tax
equivalents by all the countries/regions in these sectors.  This experiment includes removal of the
MFA quota constraints (i.e., UR1).
On the basis of the foregoing scenarios, we adjusted the projected 2005 database for the
changes brought about by the UR agreement.  We then proceed to run the following scenarios for
the new WTO negotiating round, which we refer to as the Millennium Round (MR):
8
MR1 All the countries/regions reduce their bilateral import tariffs on agriculture by 33 percent.
MR2  All the countries/regions reduce their bilateral import tariffs on minerals and
manufactured products by 33 percent.
MR3 All countries/regions reduce the import-tariff equivalents of NTBs on service sectors by 33
percent.
9
MR4 All three scenarios (MR1, MR2 and MR3) combined
Finally, for purposes of comparison with the multilateral MR scenarios, we have run the
following unilateral liberalization scenarios for India alone:
UNIMR1 India reduces its post-UR import tariffs on agriculture by 33 percent.
UNIMR2  India reduces its post-UR tariffs on the mining and manufacturing sectors by 33
percent.
UNIMR3 India reduces its tariff equivalents on services by 33 percent
UNIMR4 All three scenarios (UNIMR1, UNIMR2 and UNIMR3) combined8
Aggregate Computational Results
Tables 6-11 provide aggregate, or economy-wide, results from the multilateral scenarios as
mentioned above for the 20 countries/regions that have been modeled.  The results reported
include: absolute changes in imports, exports, and equivalent variation (a measure of economic
welfare); and percentage changes in the terms of trade, equivalent variation, real wage rate, and the
real return to capital.  Disaggregated sectoral results for India for the UR4 and MR4 scenarios are
presented in Tables 12-13.
To help the reader interpret the results, it is useful to review the features of the model that
serve to identify the various economic effects that are being captured in the different scenarios.
Although the model includes the imperfect-competition features of the New Trade Theory,
10 it
remains the case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much the same way that they
would with perfect competition.  That is, when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a
sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) substitute toward imports and the domestic-
competing industry contracts production while foreign exporters expand.  With multilateral
liberalization reducing tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously in most sectors and
countries, each country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding or contracting
depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less than in other sectors and
countries.  At the same time, countries with larger average tariff reductions than their trading
partners tend to experience a real depreciation of their currencies in order to maintain a constant
trade balance, so that all countries therefore experience mixtures of both expanding and
contracting sectors.
Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand for all sectors, with
world prices rising most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most.  This in turn causes
changes in countries’ terms of trade that can be positive or negative.  Those countries that are net
exporters of goods with the greatest degree of liberalization will experience increases in their
terms of trade as the world prices of their exports rise relative to their imports.  The reverse
occurs for net exporters in industries where liberalization is slight—perhaps because it already
happened in previous trade rounds.
The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-trade
effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional benefits9
due to elements of the New Trade Theory.  Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain
from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country
where there is a comparative advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency
gains should raise national welfare (our “equivalent variation”) for every country, although some
factor owners within a country may lose.  However, it is possible for a particular country whose
net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest liberalization to lose overall, if the
worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains.
On the other hand, although the New Trade Theory is perhaps best known for introducing
new reasons why countries may lose from trade, in fact its greatest contribution is to expand the
list of reasons for gains from trade.  It is these that are the dominant contribution of the New
Trade Theory in our model.  That is, trade liberalization permits all countries to expand their
export sectors at the same time that all sectors compete more closely with a larger number of
competing varieties from abroad.  As a result, countries as a whole gain from lower costs due to
increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions due to greater competition, and reduced
costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety.  All of these effects make it more
likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are shared across the entire
population.
In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects
countries as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor—the “scarce factor”—to
lose through the mechanism known as the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.  The additional sources
of gain from trade due to increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, however,
are shared across factors, and we routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor and capital
often gain from liberalization.
11 That is often the case here.
A final point to note concerns the modeling and role of nontariff barriers, such as are
included here especially in agriculture and textiles and apparel.  These are quantitative
restrictions, captured in the model by endogenous tariff equivalents that rise and fall with
changing supplies and demands for trade.  The tariff equivalents generate quota rents that accrue
to whatever group is granted the rights to trade under the restriction, which in the case of the
MFA is the textiles-and-apparel exporting countries.  Liberalization of these nontariff barriers
reduces or eliminates these quota rents, and this can be costly to those who possessed them10
disproportionately beforehand.  Therefore, it is not the case that exporting countries necessarily
benefit from relaxation of these trade barriers, since their loss of quota rents can more than
outweigh their gains from increased exports.  Indeed, their exports can actually decline, along
with their national welfare, if increased exports from other countries displace them in world
markets.
In the real world, all of these effects occur over time, some of them more quickly than
others.  Our model is however static, based upon a single set of equilibrium conditions rather
than relationships that vary over time.  Our results therefore refer to a time horizon that is
somewhat uncertain, depending on the assumptions that have been made about which variables
do and do not adjust to changing market conditions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these
adjustments.  Because our elasticities of supply and demand reflect relatively long-run
adjustments and because we assume that markets for both labor and capital clear within
countries, our results are appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several years – perhaps
two or three at a minimum.
On the other hand, our model does not allow for the very long-run adjustments that could
occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and technological change.  Our results
should therefore be thought of as being superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the
economies involved.  To the extent that these growth paths themselves may be influenced by
trade liberalization, therefore, our model does not capture that.
Let us turn now to the aggregate results.  As mentioned, Tables 6-11 report various
economy-wide changes for each of the countries/regions of the model.  These include changes in
exports and imports in millions of dollars, the changes in terms of trade, real wage rate and real
return to capital in percentages, and changes in economic welfare measured by equivalent
variation, both in millions of dollars and as percent of country GDP.  The terms of trade is the
world price of a country’s exports relative to its imports.  The equivalent variation is the amount
of money that, if given to the country’s consumers at initial prices, would be equivalent in terms
of their level of welfare to the effects of the assumed liberalization.  In general, as discussed
above, a worsening (fall) in a country’s terms of trade has an adverse effect on its consumers’
welfare.  But this can be outweighed by the other gains from trade due to economic efficiency
and the other benefits modeled by the New Trade theory.11
UR1:  Elimination of the MFA Quota Constraints  – The quota constraints of the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) on exports of textiles and apparel have been modeled in terms
of their export-tax equivalents for the developing countries subject to these constraints.  While
the removal of the MFA quotas is being phased in over a 10-year period, from 1995-2005, we
assume for computational purposes that they are removed all at one time.  The results in Table 6
indicate that, with increased exports of these goods to world markets, their prices fall and all
developing countries in the model except Korea and Singapore suffer a worsening of their terms
of trade.  Some of these countries also suffer a small loss in economic welfare, but others gain in
spite of the terms-of-trade loss, presumably because their exports under the MFA were most
restricted.  The greatest gainers, as percentages of their GDP, are India, Hong Kong, the
Philippines, and the Rest of South Asia group, all of which record gains that are more than half
of one percent of their GDP.  Most of the developed countries also gain from MFA elimination,
although neither their gains, nor the losses of the few losers—Australia/New Zealand and
Japan—are particularly large.
Interestingly, while trade expands by quite a bit for most countries in this scenario, it does
not expand for all.  Japan, especially, experiences such a worsening of its terms of trade that it
can afford only lower imports in return for somewhat larger exports.  Likewise, Singapore,
Malaysia, and several non-Asian LDCs experience small reductions in both exports and imports.
Changes in returns to labor and capital are quite small and mostly, but not all, positive.
The biggest gainers in terms of factor owners are labor in Hong Kong and the Philippines, where
real wages rise by more than one percent.  Otherwise, most of the changes in real factor prices are
within a tenth or two of a percent of zero.
UR2:  Full Uruguay Round Liberalization – Table 7 reports the full effects of the
Uruguay Round liberalization, to the extent that we have been able to model it. The table shows a
substantial increase in both exports and imports for all countries, and an improvement in
economic welfare for all countries except Mexico, whose NAFTA preference margins may have
been eroded due to the multilateral reductions in U.S. trade barriers.  With liberalization of both
tariffs and nontariff barriers in all sectors combined, India’s welfare increases by 1.1% of GDP,
Sri Lanka by 1.7%, and the Rest of South Asia (RSA) by 3.2%.  While the welfare increases for
the developed countries are smaller in relative terms, their total absolute gain of $115.5 billion is12
72% of the world total of $159.7 billion.  The overall gains for all countries in the model except
Mexico are shared by both labor and capital.
As mentioned earlier, we used scenario UR2 as the basis for updating our database to the
year 2005, which is the base for our subsequent scenarios for a new round of liberalization.  The
GTAP data for 1995 were first scaled up by constant growth rates for labor and output to get
estimates of output, employment, and trade for the year 2005 in the absence of the Uruguay
Round liberalization.  We then used the detailed results of scenario UR4 to adjust these data
further to include the changes that the Uruguay Round can be expected to bring about.  Thus, for
example, the trade data for each country in the model were expanded by the percentages implicit
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.  Of course, this was actually done using the disaggregated results
for percentage changes in output, trade, and employment that are applied to the scaled levels
from the GTAP data.
We turn now to the Millennium Round Scenarios.
MR1:  Agricultural Liberalization – We begin our analysis of potential future
liberalization with agriculture, since textiles and apparel have already been fully liberalized under
the commitments of the Uruguay Round.  Scenario MR1 therefore starts with the post-Uruguay
Round tariffs in agriculture, including the often quite sizable tariffs that resulted from Uruguay
Round tariffication of previous nontariff barriers.  In our scenario, we assume that these tariffs
are reduced by one-third as part of a new round of liberalization.
Table 8 reports the aggregate results of this exercise, in the same form as the tables for
the two Uruguay Round scenarios above.  In this case, as tariff reductions divert demand rather
than supply onto world markets, we see relative prices of agricultural goods rise rather than fall,
and the terms of trade of agricultural exporters such as the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada all improve.  The welfare effects of these changes are quite small, however,
and a number of countries, including the United States, are shown as losing a negligible amount
of welfare.  The reason for this loss is a bit difficult to determine, since it is so small, although
we suspect that it results from drawing resources into agriculture and out of sectors where scale
economies made them more productive.13
The biggest gainers from agricultural liberalization in this scenario are India, Sri Lanka,
and RSA, plus China and South Korea.  Their gains are likely the straightforward implications of
comparative advantage, combined with their high initial trade barriers.
MR2:  Tariff Reductions on Minerals and Manufactures – Table 9 reports results of
tariff reductions outside of agriculture.  Here again we assume for illustrative purposes that post-
Uruguay round tariffs are reduced by one-third.  Even though these tariffs tend to be lower than
in agriculture, the gains from their reduction are considerably larger because they apply to so
much more of the world economy.  Since developed country exports bulk large in these
industries, it is the terms of trade of the developed countries that improve most clearly in this
scenario.  However, even though many of the Asian economies experience worsening of their
terms of trade, the model shows them gaining welfare even more than the developed countries,
particularly as percentages of their GDPs.  This, again, is due to their high tariffs and the
economic inefficiencies as well as other losses that are associated with them.  India’s welfare
increases by 0.7% of GDP, Sri Lanka by 2.8%, and RSA by 1.8%.  As was the case in the UR4
scenario, we see here that, while the relative increases in GDP are smaller for the developed
countries, their total absolute gain of $100.9 billion is 23% of the world total of $137.8 billion.
MR3:  Services Liberalization – Although the Uruguay Round was the first round of
multilateral trade negotiations to deal at all with trade in services, it really did not succeed in
reducing any barriers to speak of.  That is why our UR2 scenario did not include any services
liberalization.  However, the Uruguay Round did set up a framework, in the form of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), for future negotiations to reduce such barriers, and it is
widely presumed that any future negotiations will make progress in this area.  Therefore, our
third scenario for the Millennium Round focuses on services liberalization.
To model barriers to trade in services, we treat them simply as tariffs on services trade,
even though in fact levying tariffs on trade in services is certainly not done, and is probably not
even possible for most services.  Nonetheless, by the same reasoning as for the use of tariff
equivalents for modeling NTBs, tariffs on trade in services may provide a first approximation to
the effects of more complex actual barriers.
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More difficult is to determine what the sizes of barriers to trade in services actually are.
Here we draw upon Hoekman (1995), who constructed what he acknowledged to be ad hoc14
“guesstimates” of ad valorem barriers to trade in services, based largely upon offers that
countries tabled during the services negotiations of the Uruguay Round.  In scenario MR3 we use
these guesstimates, reducing the model’s tariff equivalents on imports of services by one third of
these amounts.
The aggregate results are shown in Table 10.  Once again, trade of all countries in the
model expands, and welfare of all countries improves, this time by noticeably more than in the
earlier scenarios.  Welfare increases in India by 1.6% of GDP, Sri Lanka by 2.8%, and RSA by
1.9%.  The largest percentage gains accrue to Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore.  The
potential welfare benefits from the liberalization of services barriers are five times greater in total
than from the liberalization of minerals and manufactures.  While the developed countries gain of
$440.8 billion is 80% of the $687.9 billion total, the absolute gains for the developing are
nonetheless quite large.  This is indicative of the importance to both developed and developing
countries of pursuing services liberalization in the forthcoming WTO negotiations.
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MR4:  Combined Effects of MR1, MR2, and MR3 –Our final multilateral scenario
here combines the 33% reductions in barriers for all sectors: agriculture; mining and
manufactures; and services.  This is simply the combination and summation of scenarios MR1
through MR3.  The results appear in Table 11.
Not surprisingly, both the welfare and the terms-of-trade effects are similar to those in
scenario MR3, since the services liberalization turns out to dominate the liberalization in the
other sectors.  Trade expands by quite a bit more here than in MR3, since the other sectors
include a larger amount of trade being liberalized.  But because the initial barriers themselves are
so high, the welfare effects of services liberalization appear to be the most important for the well
being of the countries involved.  Of course, this conclusion is critically dependent on the large
size of Hoekman’s guesstimates of barriers, as well as on the assumption that they can be
significantly reduced through negotiations.
Sectoral Impact of Trade Liberalization on India
A major contribution that this sort of CGE modeling can make is to identify those sectors
that will expand and those that will contract as a result of various patterns of trade liberalization,
as well as the sizes of these changes.  Given our assumption that expenditure adjusts within each
country to maintain a constant level of total employment, it is necessarily the case that each15
country experiences a mixture of expansions and contractions at the industry level.  This must be
true of employment, and it is likely to be true as well for industry output.  Detailed sectoral
results are available for all the countries/regions included in the model and are available on
request.  We shall concentrate here then on the sectoral results for India that are given in Tables
12 and 13 in the UR4 and MR4 scenarios.
It is expected that trade liberalization will stimulate production of labor-intensive sectors
in India.  Productive resources would then get allocated more efficiently as compared to the pre-
liberalization situation as India would specialize in the sectors where it has comparative
advantage.  There may of course be transitional costs due to intersectoral movement of factors of
production.  Beyond such welfare gains, trade liberalization is also expected to have a “pro-
competitive” effect on domestic firms, resulting in additional gains from the realization of
economies of large-scale production.  When firms get protection from foreign competition
through tariff and non-tariff barriers, they may take advantage of their market power by raising
their prices and reducing their domestic sales.  The result is that the protected firms may produce
below their minimum-cost, efficient plant size.  Trade liberalization should then bring about
competitive pressures on the formerly protected firms and induce them to raise production and
productivity and also to achieve more efficient plant size and lower per unit costs.  Thus, gains in
economic welfare are expected to come from improved allocation of resources, lower prices to
consumers and business firms, and availability of more varieties to consumers and firms.  The
realization of economies of scale in manufacturing also reinforces the welfare enhancing effect.
It can be seen in Tables 12 and 13 that wearing apparel is the single largest gaining sector,
with increased output of 28.9% under UR4 and an additional 10.7% under MR4.  Other output-
gaining sectors under MR4 include mining and quarrying (4.1%); leather, wood, paper and their
products (2.3%); textiles (1.8%); food, beverages, and tobacco (0.3%); non-metallic mineral
products (0.3%); and manufactures including electronics equipment (10.7%).  Output declines in
other manufacturing sectors as well as in agriculture.
The changes in number of firms is indicated for the ten manufacturing sectors that are
modeled as monopolistically competitive.  These changes are consistent with the changes in
output.  The scale effect, which is the percent change in the output per firm, is positive in all the
manufacturing sectors.
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The changes in sectoral exports and imports under the MR4 scenario indicate that the
largest export-gaining manufacturing sectors, in percentage terms, include: wearing apparel;
(16.6%); textiles (9.7%); and leather, wood, paper and their products (9.4%).  The highest import
gaining manufacturing sectors, in percentage terms, include: wearing apparel (23.2%); textiles
(19.2%); food, beverages, and tobacco (18.9%); manufactures, including electronics equipment
(17.8%); and non-metallic mineral products (13.2%).  While exports of agriculture increase by
9.1%, imports increase by 8.2%.  Trade in the service sectors increases markedly in proportional
terms.
Unilateral Liberalization by India
In earlier work by Chadha et al. (1998a,b), the impacts of India’s unilateral, post-1991
economic reforms were analyzed, using a stand-alone model of the Indian economy in which the
rest-of-the-world was assumed not to undertake any liberalization.  It is interesting in this light to
consider how India would be affected by multilateral liberalization in the forthcoming WTO
negotiations as compared to what it might undertake unilaterally.  For this purpose, we repeated
the MR1-MR4 scenarios for India on a unilateral basis.  The results are reported in Table 14
together with the results of the multilateral scenarios for India noted in Tables 8-11.  It is clear
that India would gain if it undertook unilateral liberalization.  But the increases in welfare and the
returns to labor and capital are noticeably higher with the assumed multilateral scenarios.
IV.  Conclusions and Implications for Policy
The failure of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference at Seattle has led to a temporary
setback to the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.  Despite the consequent
uncertainties, the built-in agenda from the Uruguay Round has been mandated for negotiations on
agricultural and services liberalization to commence in the year 2000.  In this paper, we have
provided computational estimates of the economic effects that might be realized from trade
liberalization for India and other major trading countries/regions in the Uruguay Round and in a
new negotiating round.
An important message that emerges is that multilateral liberalization enhances the
economic welfare of the major trading countries/regions.  The expected welfare gain of the world
is close to 0.5% over the extrapolated 2005 GTAP database that incorporates the implementation17
of the Uruguay Round negotiations.  There are significant additional gains from the assumed
Millennium Round liberalization.
India’s welfare gain is 1.1% ($4.7 billion over its 2005 GDP)) when the UR scenarios get
fully implemented.  India’s additional welfare gain amounts to 2.7% ($11.4 billion) when the
assumed Millennium Round multilateral trade liberalization is completed.  Resources in India
resources are allocated towards labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, wearing apparel, leather
and leather products, and food, beverages, and tobacco.  Real returns to both labor and capital
increase.  The scale effect (percent change in output per firm) is positive for all the ten sectors of
manufacturing.  Finally, it pays even if India were to undertake unilateral trade liberalization of
the order indicated in the multilateral scenarios, with other countries not undertaking any further
liberalization.
The gains from the liberalization scenarios that have been noted should of course be
interpreted in the light of the assumptions of our modeling structure.  In particular, our
computational model abstracts from the effects of macroeconomic changes and policies.  Also,
we do not capture the effects of dynamic changes in efficiency and economic growth.  We have
also not analyzed the effects of possible changes in inflows of foreign direct investment.  Finally,
the analysis of intersectoral employment shifts makes no allowance for the constraining effects of
India’s sectoral exit barriers and its domestic labor laws.18
Table 1.  India: Tariff Structure, 1990/91 to 1997/98 (Percent)
1990/91
a 1993/94
b 1995/96 1996/97
c 1997/98
d
Applied
e Applied
e Applied
e Applied
e Applied
e
Average Unweighted
Agriculture 113 43 27 26 26
Mining 100 70 30 26 25
Manufacturing 126 73 42 40 36
Whole economy 125 71 41 39 35
Index of dispersion
f 32 42 47 49 42
Maximum tariff rate
g 355 85 50 52 45
Average Weighted
h 87 47 25 22 20
a)  Prior to reform package of July 1991.  Includes auxiliary duty mostly at 45%.
b)  The auxiliary duty was merged with the basic customs duty in the 1993/94 budget.
c)  Includes special rate of 2%.
d)  Includes special rate of 5%.
e)  Effective m.f.n. rate, i.e., actual rates applied where basic rates have been reduced by exempt rates.  However,
many exempt rates cannot be incorporated such as where the exempt rate applies to only a part of the HS six digit
tariff line.  The effective rate also excludes specific exemptions.
f)  Index of dispersion for the whole economy as measured by the coefficient of variation, percentage points.
g)  Higher than the so-called maximum rate is applied to a few items; in 1997/98, 0.4 percent of tariff lines.
h)  Weighted by 1992/93 import values.
Note:      Tariff averages consider only those tariff lines with ad valorem rates.  Year beginning  1 April.
               Classification used is based on the International Standard Industrial Classifications(ISIC):
               Agriculture  = ISIC 1; Mining = ISIC 2; Manufacturing = ISIC 3, including food processing.
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review : India 1998, p. 46.19
Table 2.   India: Tariffs by Products, Average Import-Weighted Rates, 1990-98 (Percent)
1990/91 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
Consumer Goods 153 131 86 48 36 33 25
Intermediate Goods 77 55 42 31 22 19 18
Capital Goods 97 74 50 37 29 29 24
Note:        Year beginning April 1.
Source:   WTO, Trade Policy Review: India 1998, p. 49.20
Table 3.  India: Bound Tariff Rates and Applied Rates of Duty (Percent)
Bound rate of duty
a by year
2005
Applied rate of duty
b 1997/98
Average unweighted tariff (percent)
Agriculture (ISIC 1) 94 26
Mining (ISIC 2) 36 25
Manufacturing (ISIC 3, includes food
processing)
52 36
Whole economy 54 35
Average unweighted tariff by stage of processing (percent)
Unprocessed 74 25
Semi-processed 44 35
Processed 56 37
a)  Includes only items bound during the Uruguay Round.  The bound rates do not include the commitments
under the Information Technology Agreement
b)  Effective m.f.n. rate, i.e., actual rates applied where basic rates have been reduced by exempt rates.
However, many exempt rates cannot be incorporated such as where the exempt rate applies to only a part
of the HS six digit tariff line.  The effective rate also excludes specific exemptions.
Note:     Tariff averages consider only those tariff lines with ad valorem rates, Year beginning 1 April
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review: India 1998, p. 54.21
Table 4.  Countries/Regions of the Model
COUNTRIES/REGIONS                 CODE
                      (1)            (2)
1.Developed
 Australia and New Zealand ANZ
 Canada CAN
 European Union and EFTA EUF
 Japan JPN
 United States USA
2. Developing
 2.a Asian
 India  IND
 Sri Lanka  LKA
 Rest of South Asia  RSA
 China  CHN
 ong Kong  HKG
 Korea  KOR
 Singapore  SGP
 Indonesia  IDN
 Malaysia  MYS
 Philippines  PHL
 Thailand  THA
 2. b Other
 Mexico MEX
 Turkey TUR
 Central European Associates CEA
 Central and South America and Associates A_N22
Table 5: Sectors of Production
SN COMMODITY CODE
1 Agriculture AGR
2 Mining and Quarrying MIN
3 Food, Beverages, and Tobacco FBT
4 Textiles TEX
5 Wearing Apparel WAP
6 Leather, Wood, and  Paper & Products LWP
7 Chemicals, Rubber, Plastic, and Petroleum Products CRP
8 Non-Metallic Mineral Products NMM
9 Metal and Metal Products MMP
10 Transport and Machinery Equipment & Parts TEM
11 Manufactures, including Electronic Equip. OMF
12 Electricity, Gas, and Water EGW
13 Construction CNS
14 Trade and Transport T_T
15 Finance, Business, and Recreational Services OSP
16 Public Administration, Defense, Education and Health & Dwellings RSR23
Table 6.   UR1:Complete Elimination of Export-Tax Equivalents of MFA Quota Constraints
IMPORTS EXPORTS TERMS EQUIVALENT VARIATION
Million Million OF TRADE Percent Million
Dollars Dollars Percent Change Dollars
COUNTRIES/REGIONS CODE
Change
WAGE RATE
Percent
Change
RETURN TO
CAPITAL
Percent Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.Developed 8897 6812 -- 0.0 5310 -- --
 Australia & New Zealand ANZ 131 104 0.0 -0.0 -56 0.0 0.0
 Canada CAN 698 620 0.1 0.1 1087 0.0 0.1
 EUN and EFTA EUF 2202 1924 0.1 0.0 818 0.0 0.0
 Japan JPN -25 262 -0.0 -0.0 -2209 -0.0 0.0
 USA USA 5890 3903 0.1 0.1 5671 0.0 0.1
2. Developing 7889 10245 -- 0.1 3077 -- --
 2.a Asian 8302 10453 -- 0.2 4579 -- --
 India  IND 1528 1980 -0.9 0.6 2485 0.1 0.2
 Sri Lanka  LKA 47 107 -1.1 0.2 30 -0.1 0.2
 Rest of South Asia  RSA 455 641 -1.0 0.5 628 0.1 0.2
 China  CHN 2259 3130 -0.3 0.1 726 0.1 -0.0
 Hong Kong  HKG 2106 2253 -0.2 0.8 1074 1.2 0.1
 Korea  KOR 420 414 0.0 -0.0 -158 0.0 -0.0
 Singapore  SGP -353 -398 0.0 -0.2 -154 -0.0 0.0
 Indonesia  IDN 105 163 -0.1 -0.1 -237 0.0 -0.0
 Malaysia  MYS -123 -92 -0.0 -0.1 -167 0.1 -0.0
 Philippines  PHL 1706 1999 -0.9 0.6 517 1.6 -0.3
 Thailand  THA 152 257 -0.1 -0.1 -165 0.2 -0.0
 2. b Other -412 -209 -- -0.1 -1501 -- --
 Mexico MEX -68 11 -0.0 -0.1 -252 -0.0 -0.0
 Turkey TUR -137 -98 -0.1 -0.1 -217 -0.0 -0.0
 Central European Associates CEA -40 -20 -0.0 -0.0 -83 -0.0 0.0
 Central, South America etc A_N -167 -102 -0.1 -0.1 -950 -0.0 -0.0
 3. World Total 16787 17056 -- 0.0 8388 -- --24
Table 7.  UR2: Elimination of MFA Quota Constraints, Agricultural Liberalization, and Liberalization of Minerals and Manufactures
EQUIVALENT VARIATION IMPORTS
Million
Dollars
EXPORTS
Million
Dollars
TERMS
OF TRADE
Percent
Change
Percent
Change
Million Dollars
WAGE
RATE
Percent
Change
COUNTRIES/REGIONS CODE RETURN TO
CAPITAL
Percent Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.Developed 83792 77989 -- 0.4 115546 -- --
 Australia & New Zealand ANZ 3960 3436 0.5 0.6 3214 0.4 0.6
 Canada CAN 2748 2624 0.1 0.3 2271 0.2 0.3
 EUN and EFTA EUF 31410 27870 0.4 0.4 48037 0.2 0.2
 Japan JPN 13326 11563 0.4 0.3 21357 0.1 0.2
 USA USA 32347 32497 -0.2 0.4 40667 0.3 0.4
2. Developing 64157 69914 -- 0.8 44143 -- --
 2.a Asian 51209 57160 -- 1.3 37123 -- --
 India  IND 4522 6012 -3.0 1.1 4738 0.5 0.7
 Sri Lanka  LKA 212 297 -1.7 1.7 286 1.1 1.4
 Rest of South Asia  RSA 3994 5473 -8.3 3.2 3749 1.9 2.2
 China  CHN 22091 25809 -1.3 1.5 13330 1.0 0.9
 Hong Kong  HKG 3150 2646 0.5 1.3 1700 1.8 0.7
 Korea  KOR 4392 3702 0.4 0.8 4741 0.4 0.4
 Singapore  SGP 2794 2243 0.3 1.6 1221 2.0 2.3
 Indonesia  IDN 1346 1287 0.1 0.5 1194 0.5 0.2
 Malaysia  MYS 1888 2174 -0.2 1.1 1310 1.6 1.4
 Philippines  PHL 5112 6050 -3.0 3.3 2913 3.6 1.7
 Thailand  THA 1707 1467 0.2 0.9 1941 1.0 0.3
 2. b Other 12948 12753 -- 0.3 7020 -- --
 Mexico MEX 324 460 -0.0 -0.2 -795 0.2 -0.2
 Turkey TUR 477 318 0.3 0.5 1007 0.1 0.2
 Central European Associates CEA 2581 2248 0.2 0.5 1814 0.3 0.3
 Central, South America etc A_N 9565 9727 -0.2 0.3 4994 0.1 -0.0
 3. World Total 147949 147903 -- 0.5 159689 -- --25
Table 8.  MR1: 33 Percent Bilateral Reduction in Post-Uruguay Round Tariffs on Agricultural  Products
IMPORTS EXPORTS TERMS EQUIVALENT VARIATION WAGE RETURN
Million Million OF TRADE Percent Million RATE TO
Dollars Dollars Percent Change Dollars Percent CAPITAL
Change Change Percent
 COUNTRIES/REGIONS CODE
Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.Developed 10934 10433 -- 0.0 4390 -- --
 Australia & New Zealand ANZ 706 418 0.3 0.0 79 -0.0 -0.1
 Canada CAN 203 -79 0.1 0.0 85 -0.0 -0.0
 EUN and EFTA EUF 2504 2412 -0.0 0.0 2742 0.0 0.0
 Japan JPN 3105 4166 -0.2 0.0 2675 0.1 0.1
 USA USA 4417 3515 0.1 -0.0 -1191 -0.0 -0.0
2. Developing 5522 5386 -- 0.1 5751 -- --
 2.a Asian 3863 4177 -- 0.2 5500 -- --
 India  IND 249 253 -0.0 0.4 1541 0.0 0.0
 Sri Lanka  LKA 36 33 0.1 0.4 59 0.1 0.0
 Rest of South Asia  RSA 184 224 -0.1 0.7 801 0.1 0.2
 China  CHN 836 595 0.0 0.2 1496 0.0 0.0
 Hong Kong  HKG 93 136 0.0 -0.0 -8 0.0 0.0
 Korea  KOR 1051 1465 -0.2 0.2 925 0.2 0.2
 Singapore  SGP 237 238 0.0 0.1 53 0.2 0.2
 Indonesia  IDN 156 113 0.0 0.0 113 0.0 -0.0
 Malaysia  MYS 456 527 -0.1 0.3 377 0.2 0.2
 Philippines  PHL 254 315 -0.1 0.3 235 0.1 0.2
 Thailand  THA 311 278 0.1 -0.0 -92 0.3 -0.1
 2. b Other 1659 1209 -- 0.0 252 -- --
 Mexico MEX 52 -80 0.1 0.0 40 0.0 -0.0
 Turkey TUR 257 285 -0.0 0.2 396 0.0 0.1
 Central European Associates CEA 310 269 0.1 0.0 31 0.0 -0.0
 Central, South America etc A_N 1042 735 0.2 -0.0 -215 -0.0 -0.1
 3. World Total 16456 15819 -- 0.0 10141 -- --26
Table 9.  MR2: 33 Percent Bilateral Reduction of Post-Uruguay Tariffs on Minerals and Manufactures
IMPORTS EXPORTS TERMS EQUIVALENT VARIATION WAGE RETURN
Million Million OF TRADE Percent Million RATE TO
Dollars Dollars Percent Change Dollars Percent CAPITAL
Change Change Percent
 COUNTRIES/REGIONS  CODE
Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.Developed 70352 64526 -- 0.4 100858 -- --
 Australia & New Zealand ANZ 3565 3346 0.2 0.4 2127 0.3 0.4
 Canada CAN 1887 2047 -0.0 0.3 2337 0.1 0.2
 EUN and EFTA EUF 27226 26326 0.1 0.4 40522 0.1 0.2
 Japan JPN 18451 15250 0.5 0.6 37431 0.1 0.2
 USA USA 19223 17558 0.1 0.2 18441 0.1 0.2
2. Developing 61014 67140 -- 0.7 36912 -- --
 2.a Asian 46965 50782 -- 1.0 29215 -- --
 India  IND 3161 3934 -1.4 0.7 3031 0.3 0.5
 Sri Lanka  LKA 386 450 -1.2 2.8 475 1.3 1.7
 Rest of South Asia  RSA 1781 1895 -0.6 1.8 2078 0.6 0.9
 China  CHN 16845 19962 -1.1 0.8 6885 0.8 0.8
 Hong Kong  HKG 3051 1906 1.1 1.4 1746 1.3 0.9
 Korea  KOR 7356 7448 -0.1 1.0 5566 0.6 0.4
 Singapore  SGP 2840 2133 0.4 1.4 1017 1.7 1.7
 Indonesia  IDN 2037 2015 0.0 0.6 1578 0.6 0.3
 Malaysia  MYS 2951 3233 -0.3 1.6 1919 2.0 2.0
 Philippines  PHL 3400 3959 -1.4 3.3 2853 2.4 1.7
 Thailand  THA 3158 3848 -0.8 1.0 2067 1.7 1.0
 2. b Other 14049 16358 -- 0.3 7697 -- --
 Mexico MEX 956 1174 -0.2 0.4 1342 0.2 0.2
 Turkey TUR 1331 1453 -0.3 0.8 1645 0.3 0.2
 Central European Associates CEA 3708 4149 -0.4 0.6 2199 0.6 0.5
 Central, South America etc A_N 8053 9582 -0.8 0.1 2510 0.1 0.1
 3. World Total 131366 131666 -- 0.4 137770 -- --27
Table 10.  MR3: 33 Percent Bilateral Reduction in Tariff Equivalents of Services Barriers
IMPORTS EXPORTS TERMS EQUIVALENT VARIATION WAGE RETURN
Million Million OF TRADE Percent Million RATE TO
Dollars Dollars Percent Change Dollars Percent CAPITAL
Change Change Percent
 COUNTRIES/REGIONS  CODE
Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.Developed 172892 174574 -- 2.0 550780 -- --
 Australia & New Zealand ANZ 7632 8110 -0.6 2.9 15115 0.8 0.9
 Canada CAN 9766 10207 -0.2 2.8 20226 0.8 0.9
 EUN and EFTA EUF 62706 64920 -0.1 1.9 210118 0.3 0.3
 Japan JPN 35598 39455 -0.6 1.9 125563 0.3 0.4
 USA USA 57191 51882 0.5 2.0 179758 0.5 0.4
2. Developing 85237 85166 -- 2.5 137085 -- --
 2.a Asian 56111 56232 -- 2.4 70476 -- --
 India  IND 2028 2152 -0.2 1.6 6840 0.3 0.4
 Sri Lanka  LKA 508 590 -1.5 2.8 476 2.0 2.2
 Rest of South Asia  RSA 945 954 -0.1 1.9 2186 0.4 0.6
 China  CHN 8398 9235 -0.2 1.3 11812 0.5 0.5
 Hong Kong  HKG 14933 13721 1.1 8.3 10540 5.9 6.1
 Korea  KOR 10890 11454 -0.3 2.7 15527 1.0 1.1
 Singapore  SGP 3659 2463 0.7 3.8 2827 6.8 5.0
 Indonesia  IDN 2402 2481 -0.1 2.4 6169 0.6 0.5
 Malaysia  MYS 2181 2153 0.0 1.9 2301 1.1 1.0
 Philippines  PHL 2910 3138 -0.7 3.5 3065 2.3 2.4
 Thailand  THA 7257 7890 -0.8 4.2 8733 4.1 3.3
 2. b Other 29125 28934 -- 2.5 66609 -- --
 Mexico MEX 4136 4218 -0.1 3.0 10699 0.8 0.9
 Turkey TUR 4436 3450 2.2 3.5 7390 1.0 1.9
 Central European Associates CEA 8481 8326 0.1 2.5 9132 1.4 1.3
 Central, South America etc A_N 12073 12939 -0.5 2.3 39388 0.4 0.5
 3. World Total 258128 259740 -- 2.1 687865 -- --28
Table 11.  MR4: 33 Percent Bilateral Tariff Reductions in All Sectors Combined (MR1, MR2 and MR3)
IMPORTS EXPORTS TERMS EQUIVALENT VARIATION WAGE RETURN
Million Million OF TRADE Percent Million RATE TO
Dollars Dollars Percent Change Dollars Percent CAPITAL
Change Change Percent
 CODE
Change
COUNTRIES/REGIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.Developed 254179 249532 -- 2.4 656028 -- --
 Australia & New Zealand ANZ 11903 11874 -0.0 3.4 17320 1.1 1.1
 Canada CAN 11855 12176 -0.1 3.1 22648 0.9 1.0
 EUN and EFTA EUF 92436 93657 -0.0 2.3 253381 0.5 0.5
 Japan JPN 57153 58871 -0.2 2.5 165669 0.5 0.7
 USA USA 80831 72955 0.7 2.2 197009 0.6 0.5
2. Developing 151772 157692 -- 3.2 179748 -- --
 2.a Asian 106939 111191 -- 3.6 105191 -- --
 India  IND 5438 6340 -1.6 2.7 11412 0.6 1.0
 Sri Lanka  LKA 930 1074 -2.6 6.0 1010 3.3 3.9
 Rest of South Asia  RSA 2910 3074 -0.8 4.4 5065 1.1 1.7
 China  CHN 26078 29791 -1.2 2.2 20193 1.4 1.3
 Hong Kong  HKG 18076 15763 2.2 9.6 12277 7.2 7.1
 Korea  KOR 19297 20367 -0.6 3.9 22018 1.8 1.7
 Singapore  SGP 6735 4834 1.2 5.2 3897 8.6 6.9
 Indonesia  IDN 4595 4609 0.0 3.1 7859 1.1 0.8
 Malaysia  MYS 5587 5913 -0.3 3.8 4598 3.3 3.2
 Philippines  PHL 6564 7411 -2.2 7.0 6153 4.7 4.3
 Thailand  THA 10727 12016 -1.5 5.2 10708 6.1 4.2
 2. b Other 44833 46501 -- 2.8 74558 -- --
 Mexico MEX 5144 5312 -0.2 3.4 12081 1.0 1.0
 Turkey TUR 6024 5188 1.9 4.5 9432 1.3 2.2
 Central European Associates CEA 12499 12743 -0.2 3.1 11363 1.9 1.8
 Central, South America etc A_N 21167 23257 -1.2 2.4 41682 0.5 0.4
 3. World Total 405951 407224 -- 2.5 835776 -- --29
Table 12.  UR4: Sectoral Effect on Exports, Imports, Output, Number of Firms, and Change in Employment in India
EMPLOYMENT
SN COMMODITY CODE EXPORTS IMPORTS OUTPUT
NO. of
FIRMS
SCALE
EFFECT CAPITAL PERCENT TOTAL
1 Agriculture AGR 1.7 -1.3 -0.1 -- -- -0.2 -0.1 -275754
2 Mining and Quarrying MIN 4.8 -1.4 1.7 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.3 38025
3 Food, Beverages, and Tobacco FBT 11.0 17.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 59522
4 Textiles TEX 18.6 6.5 4.0 3.1 0.9 3.3 3.6 373078
5 Wearing Apparel WAP 54.1 -6.9 28.9 27.9 1.0 28.3 28.6 207899
6 Leather, Wood, and  Paper & Products LWP 6.8 28.6 -0.6 -1.2 0.6 -1.1 -0.8 -56635
7 Chemicals, Rubber, Plastic & Petr. Prod CRP 5.6 13.3 -1.3 -1.9 0.6 -1.7 -1.4 -23622
8 Non-Metallic Mineral Products NMM 7.7 23.2 -0.6 -1.2 0.6 -1.3 -1.0 -30563
9 Metal and Metal Products MMP 5.3 8.1 -2.7 -3.1 0.4 -3.1 -2.7 -85391
10 Transport and Machinery Equipment & Parts TEM 4.6 18.9 -5.1 -6.0 0.9 -6.2 -5.8 -195812
11 Manufactures, including Electronic Equip. OMF -0.2 24.7 -1.0 -1.5 0.5 -1.6 -1.3 -59981
12 Electricity, Gas, and Water EGW 3.2 -2.2 1.0 -- -- 0.3 0.6 9594
13 Construction CNS 3.2 -2.7 -0.5 -- -- -0.5 -0.1 -14447
14 Trade and Transport T_T 2.2 -3.3 0.1 -- -- -0.2 0.2 89911
15 Finance, Business, and Recreational Services OSP 2.0 -2.8 -0.5 -- -- -0.4 -0.1 -2455
16 Public Admn, Defense, Edn, Health &
Dwellings
RSR 1.2 -2.3 -0.5 -- -- -0.4 -0.1 -33369
All Sectors 12.1 9.1 0.2 0.0 -- -- 0.0 0
Note: All figures are in percent unless specified30
Table 13.  MR4: Sectoral Effect on Exports, Imports, Output, Number of Firms, and Change in Employment in India
EMPLOYMENT
SN COMMODITY CODE EXPORTS IMPORTS OUTPUT
NO. of
FIRMS
SCALE
EFFECT CAPITAL PERCENT TOTAL
1 Agriculture AGR 9.1 8.2 -0.1 -- -- -0.2 -0.1 -229492
2 Mining and Quarrying MIN 7.5 -3.2 4.1 3.0 1.1 3.3 3.4 100167
3 Food, Beverages, and Tobacco FBT 7.3 18.9 0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.3 25475
4 Textiles TEX 9.7 19.5 1.8 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.6 166091
5 Wearing Apparel WAP 16.6 23.3 10.7 9.9 0.8 10.1 10.6 76751
6 Leather, Wood, and Paper & Products LWP 9.4 4.6 2.3 1.5 0.8 1.6 2.1 155858
7 Chemicals, Rubber, Plastic & Petr. Prod. CRP 7.1 7.9 -0.3 -1.1 0.8 -0.9 -0.4 -7014
8 Non-Metallic Mineral Products NMM 7.9 13.2 0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -11246
9 Metal and Metal Products MMP 5.9 9.9 -1.8 -2.6 0.8 -2.5 -2.0 -62549
10 Transport and Machinery Equipment & Parts TEM 6.0 9.4 -2.1 -3.3 1.2 -3.6 -3.1 -104192
11 Manufactures, including Electronic Equip. OMF 5.5 17.8 0.1 -0.9 1.0 -0.9 -0.5 -23092
12 Electricity, Gas, and Water EGW 64.6 50.1 0.7 -- -- 0.1 0.5 7881
13 Construction CNS 21.3 19.2 -0.1 -- -- -0.3 0.2 20648
14 Trade and Transport T_T 41.5 41.8 -0.6 -- -- -1.3 -0.7 -297355
15 Finance, Business, and Recreational Services OSP 23.5 25.0 0.0 -- -- -0.4 0.1 1701
16 Public Admn, Defense, Edn, Health &
Dwellings
RSR 21.9 17.0 0.7 -- -- -0.1 0.4 144329
All Sectors 11.4 9.9 0.4 -0.2 -- -- 0.0 0
Note: All figures are in percent unless specified31
      Table 14.  Impact of Multilateral and Unilateral Trade Liberalization for India
MR1 MR2 MR3 MR4
Multilateral
Equivalent Variation
 Percent 0.4 0.7 1.6 2.7
 Million US dollars 1541 3031 6840 11412
Returns to Factors, % change
 Wage Rate 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6
 Returns to Capital 0.0 0.5 0.4 1.0
Trade
 Imports (million US dollars) 249 3161 2028 5438
 Exports (million US dollars) 253 3934 2152 6340
Unilateral
Equivalent Variation
 Percent 0.4 0.3 1.3 2.0
 Million US dollars 1709 1317 5350 8376
Returns to Factors, % change
 Wage Rate 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
 Returns to Capital 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.8
Trade
 Imports (million US dollars) 134 2086 1070 3290
 Exports (million US dollars) 197 3264 1599 5060
Multilateral
MR1: 33 percent bilateral reduction in post-Uruguay round tariffs on agricultural products
MR2: 33 percent bilateral reduction in post-Uruguay round tariffs on minerals and manufactures
MR3: 33 percent bilateral reduction in tariff equivalents of  barriers to trade in services
MR4: 33 percent bilateral tariffs reduction in all sectors combined (MR1, MR2 and MR3)
Unilateral
India’s unilateral :
MR1 : 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay round tariffs on agricultural products
MR2 : 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay round tariffs on minerals and manufactures
MR3 : 33 percent reduction in tariff equivalent of  barriers to trade in services
MR4:  33 percent tariff reduction in all sectors combined (MR1, MR2 and MR3)32
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ENDNOTES
                                                
* This paper is part of the ongoing collaborative program of CGE modeling research beginning in 1994
between the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi, and the University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  In this connection, see Chadha, Pohit, Deardorff and Stern (1998a,b) and
Chadha and Pohit (1998).  We would like to express our gratitude to S. L. Rao and Rakesh Mohan for
active and sustained support of the NCAER-UM collaborative research effort.  Special thanks are due to
K. L. Krishna, Arvind Panagariya, V. N. Pandit, and T. N. Srinivasan for having provided valuable
comments on our earlier work.  Thanks are also due to Sanjib Pohit who participated in the earlier work.
Devender Pratap, Bikram Prakas Ghosh, and Praveen Sachdeva of the NCAER and Alan Fox and
Soraphol Tulayasathien of the University of Michigan provided excellent research assistance.
1 Prior to the announcement of India’s Export and Import Policy (1992-97), all imports unless specifically
exempted required a license or a customs-clearance permit.  All imports were classified under one of four
main licensing types: restricted items; banned items; limited permissible items; and open general licenses
(OGL).  The items falling under OGL were only nominally unrestricted.  In practice, many OGL imports
required government approval, and most remained subject to actual user conditions.  The system was
made more complicated by applying different import and approval procedures between license types and
frequently shifting products across licensing categories.
2 The goods under licensing included: precious, semi-precious and other stones; safety, security and
related items; seeds plants and animals; insecticides and pesticides; drugs and pharmaceuticals;
chemicals and allied items; items relating to small scale sector; and miscellaneous and special categories.
3 India implemented the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) for classifying
imports and exports in February 1986.  Although the Indian Customs Tariff Schedule is sub-divided into
5,134 standard HS six-digit codes (as of April 1, 1997), India uses a 10-digit HS classification for import-
licensing purposes.
4 The Chelliah Committee recommended seven different rates of customs tariff, namely 5, 10, 15, 20, 25,
30 and 50% to be achieved by 1997-98 (Govt. of India, Tax Reforms Committee, 1993).  It was further
suggested that additional or special protection might be given for a limited period to new industries, new
products, or new technologies.  The 5% rate was to apply to inputs for fertilizer and newsprint, 10 and
15% to other basic inputs, 20% to capital goods, and 25% to chemicals and intermediates.  Other final
products (excluding inessential consumer goods) would be charged 30% duty.  Inessential consumer
goods, if permitted for import, would have a duty rate of 50%.
While the multiple suggested tariff rates can be used to achieve the Committee's philosophy of systematic
escalation according to the degree of processing, the result may be effective rates of protection that are
much higher than the nominal tariffs on finished goods.  Thus, for example, when QRs on consumer
goods are removed, a 50% duty on imports of consumer goods combined with 25% or less duty on
tradable inputs would lead to an effective rate of protection close to 100% (Joshi and Little, 1994, p. 76).
This tariff escalation has been prevalent in India's economy throughout the 1990s.  Whereas the simple
average tariff on processed goods was 37% in 1997-98, that on unprocessed goods (primary products)
had an average tariff of 25%.  Significant tariff escalation is further evident in: paper and paper products;
printing and publishing; wood and wood products; and food, beverages and tobacco (WTO, 1998, p. 19).
5 India obtained the right to use QRs from GATT in 1949 for balance-of-payments reasons and retained it
since.  This right was reasserted in its Uruguay Round submissions.  But, as noted below, these QRs are
to be phased out by 2001.
6 See Chadha (2000) for a more detailed analysis of India’s services commitments and policies.35
                                                                                                                                                            
7 Under the ATC agreement, quota growth rates will increase in stages over the decade from 1995-2005..
We assumed in our computations that the MFA quota constraints are eliminated all at once.
8 The post-Uruguay Round tariff data were adapted from Francois and Strutt (1999).
9 The ad valorem equivalents of services barriers were adapted from the “guesstimates” provided in
Hoekman (1995).
10 The agricultural sector in the model is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and the manufacturing and
services sectors are assumed to be monopolistically competitive with free entry.
11 For details, see Brown et al. (1993).
12 See Brown and Stern (1999) for a CGE analysis in which the services barriers are modeled in terms of
raising the cost of providing services through foreign direct investment.
13 A similar conclusion was reached in earlier work by Brown et al. (1996).
14 Scale effects were not calculated for the services sectors because of the lack of data on numbers of
firms.